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Compliance

Find phone-only Entra users before Microsoft-provided SMS and voice retires

Cover: Microsoft retiring its own SMS and voice delivery and defaulting to passkeys, and a runbook, read-only by default, that sorts every Entra user into method-strength groups so the telephony-only list is ready to act on

Microsoft has put dates on retiring its own SMS and voice delivery for MFA, and the first question that comes up is who is still on a phone code. Microsoft's analyzer tells you if the tenant is in scope, this runbook tells you who, and keeps those people in Entra groups you can use for a registration campaign and for system-preferred authentication.

When Apple jumps a version, your Intune compliance quietly drifts

Cover: Apple ships a new major iOS version, a public feed catches it overnight, and an email lands the next morning telling you to raise the Intune OS-version compliance floor

We keep our Apple devices on an n-1 compliance line. Corporate devices have to be on the latest major iOS or one version behind it, personal devices one more back than that, and the same idea on macOS for the corporate ones. For years that was simple math. iOS 18 is out, so the floor is 17, and a quick check every September kept us honest.

Then Apple changed how it numbers things. iOS 18 didn't become iOS 19, it jumped straight to iOS 26. Any rule that worked out the floor by subtracting one from the current number was suddenly wrong, and a compliance policy can drift like that for weeks before anyone notices, usually when a device that should have been blocked quietly is not. This is the small automation we built so we stop finding out late.

Governing Intune device wipes with Multi Admin Approval

Cover: an Intune device-wipe request stopped at a two-person approval gate, with a read-only runbook alerting and reporting on every approval

A while back a device wipe request sat in our Intune approval queue for most of a day before anyone noticed it. Nothing was broken. That is just how Multi Admin Approval works, and it is the gap this post is about.

If you have turned MAA on for device wipe and retire, you already know the good part. One admin asks for the wipe, a different admin has to approve it, and no single person can factory reset a laptop on their own. I like it. It is the kind of guardrail that should have been in the product years ago.

Here is the part nobody warns you about. Microsoft gave you the gate, but it forgot the doorbell. There is no email when a request comes in, no ticket, nothing shows up on a dashboard. It quietly assumes someone is sitting in Tenant administration > Multi Admin Approval > Received requests all day, and in real life nobody does that. So legitimate wipes stall, the service desk opens "wipe not working" tickets that were never broken, and months later nobody can tell you who approved what.

I did not want to give my one admin a new job of babysitting that screen. So I built the missing half instead. It is a small read-only runbook that watches the queue, emails the service desk the moment a request lands, and keeps its own history for Power BI. It can read the approval requests and nothing else. It cannot approve, it cannot reject, it cannot wipe. Below is how it works and how to set it up in your own tenant.

Who's running Ollama on your fleet? A read-only shadow-AI inventory

Cover: read-only shadow-AI inventory flagging unsanctioned local AI tools and leavers

Somewhere on your fleet right now, someone has quietly installed a local LLM. Maybe it's Ollama pulling a model, maybe LM Studio, maybe a coding assistant quietly indexing your repos into a local model that sits on the laptop — and never gets wiped when they leave. Intune won't tell you — it doesn't inventory "AI tools" as a thing. This is a scheduled, read-only collector that turns shadow AI into a governance report: who's running what, sanctioned or not, and the finding that should worry you most — leavers who still have it installed.